Justin Bailey's Gaddafi

1. “I read one adamant young hopeful suggesting that the whole ordeal was a CIA mission to destabilise policy-makers restricting American regional oil interests!”

The Libyan issue captured the interest of more than just military strategists; a bounty of literature emerged ranging from hard-hitting political journalism to speculative idealism. Amidst the ifs and maybes, one thing was clearly visible: the deterioration of the old and the dawning of the new. For better or worse, this was an exciting prospect to any onlooker and a treat for commentators the world over.

2. “The military presence in Libya operated under the assumption that the Libyan problem would eventually unravel itself. The trouble is that reality caught up.”

The West’s choice of action, inevitably moulded by the petrifying legacy of Iraq, was one of peace and stability, not intervention and invasion. The MoD released a statement shortly after the adoption of the No Fly Zone communicating their expectation of being involved with the operation for at least six months.

3. “Course, the uprisings in the Middle East had been characterised by a surgical speed and efficiency.”

At the time, six months seemed to be an absurdly long timeframe. In all other scenarios, the media’s challenge had been how to release one headline before a new one trumped it, not how to keep a story alive for more than half a year.

4. “Let’s face it, two months later and it’s clear the stalemate in Libya is unbreakable!”

Continuous presence in Libya is proving the sense behind the MoD’s calculation. Presumably, the objective of the UN resolution was to prevent Muammar Gaddafi’s forces making gains until either he stepped down voluntarily or was abandoned by his ludicrously strong support structure.

5. “The problem is that the intervening forces didn’t give themselves the power to get involved actively at any level.”

NATO’s refusal to apologise for bombing rebel tanks on the grounds that they were threatening civilian lives reflects the West’s reluctance to take any decisive action towards a resolution in Tripoli or even declare full allegiance to either side of the conflict. Conversely, the mission objective as it stands seems to be one of maintaining a peaceful status quo in Libya at the expense of a decisive outcome.

6. “Nah, it’s wrong to suggest that the ‘keeping peaceful’ approach is at all naïve.”

The logic behind it is perfectly clear: the West has seen the results of strident and aggressive interventionist policies in the Middle East, and international decision-making has quite rightly learnt from previous mistakes. The Libyan strategy, therefore, reveals a new method of foreign policy based on the fundamental principle that nations must actively dictate their own identity. According to this standard, the role played by military intervention must be limited to relatively impartial policing of conduct within an active warzone.

7. “We can only wait to see if an effective outcome will be produced. My guess is as good as yours.”

By refusing to put full unconditional support behind the rebels, the West has maintained its passivity in the conflict. However, this begs the question of whether stability in Libya is viable even after the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime. The opposition to Gaddafi is currently a collection of disorganised, poorly armed and untrained dissidents who happen to have the most sophisticated air force the world has ever known supporting them. If the West continues to pursue a ‘hands off’ policy which involves very little interference in the structure of Libyan politics, will there be a future after Gaddafi and an alternative to the tyranny for which the current regime is known?